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Where Are We Drifting?
By WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.

President, Colorado Bar Association

The lawyer population of Colorado has increased at such a rate during
the past four years as to become a matter of public interest and of thoughtful
concern to the profession. Neither the public nor lawyers will decry healthy
competition within the legal profession; but everyone is vitally affected when
the legal profession becomes -over-crowded. We are not so far removed from
the ethico-economic difficulties experienced by attorneys during the last depression not to be well aware of the manifold problems it engendered. The
pressure caused by overcrowding in a period of economic stress resulted in
increased violation of ethical codes and concepts. The public should not suffer
this situation to arise again, and we cannot afford it with the attendant bad
publicity for the entire profession.
The present situation in Colorado is obviously not a healthy one, and
it is one that is patently unfair to the newly admitted attorney. In 1940 the
lawyer population in Colorado was 1628 lawyers, or one attorney to every
772 persons. During the period 1940-1948, the Colorado Supreme Court
admitted 676 persons to practice-a trifle higher than a 40% increase in the
lawyer population. At the end of 1948, (making allowance for deaths and
retirements within the profession and for a population increase in the state),
the ratio of lawyers to population was about one to every 625 persons--being
a 20% decline in the ratio. The prospects are that the ratio will continue to
adversely decline. In the last three years, 378 lawyers were admitted. For
this one year-1949-the figure will probably exceed 225 admissions. This
amounts to an increase of 600 lawyers within four years or 150 per year as
contrasted with the average of the 1930-40 decade of about 70 per year.
We cannot dismiss this increase as a post-war adjustment because the
1940-49 increase is far in excess of the 1930-39 increase computed on a population basis. Moreover, the national figures sustain the view that the situation
in Colorado will soon become acute. In the ratio of lawyers' to population,
Colorado stood fifteenth in the nation in 1940; today it stands about in eighth
place.
In law school enrollments, Colorado now stands in fifth place in the
national percentage of increased enrollment in law schools, with an increase
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of 145% over the 1939 base. Denver University shows a phenomenal increase of 335% in enrollment, being fourth in the ranking of all law schools,
according to the rate of increase. To secure a clearer comprehension of the
future, there were 747 students in Colorado's law schools in the fall of 1948.
This enrollment is approximately 47% of the total number of lawyers
practicing in Colorado in 1940.
The possibility that this alarming increase is attributable in Colorado to
reduced standards of admission to the bar cannot be overlooked. Colorado,
in 1948 passed 85% of all its applicants for admission to practice. Contrast
this percentage with 1938-41 average of 64.5%-the high year for that
period being 73%. Or contrast it with the national average of 60% in 1948the highest national percentage for the past eleven years.
Again Colorado was one of ten states adopting the diploma rule for
veterans who had been prior residents of the state. Although this rule was
restricted to veterans, 88 persons were admitted under this provision, some
of whom had failed the Colorado bar examinations on three or four past
occasions. Added to this figure are 65 attorneys from other states admitted
on motion during the same 1945-48 period, for a total of 153 persons admitted without any type of examination as to their legal knowledge. Finally,
there has been a tendency on the part of the court to show leniency in considering examination grades after they have been computed by the board of
bar examiners. This factor has contributed to some extent to increase the
number of admissions.
What do all of those figures mean? They mean, first of all, that the
public and the bar will probably have a rather unpleasant situation to deal
with in the next few years. Every thinking lawyer, now engaged in the profession, dreads its implications, not so much in his own case as for the effect
against the profession generally. It is not the fear of competition. Instead,
it is the multiple problem of a rapid absorption of large numbers of fledgling
lawyers in a short space of time rather than in smaller numbers over a longer
period of time, and of painfully overcrowding the profession which in turn
fosters unethical practices.
The bar must seek an immediate solution to this problem. It cannot
afford to ignore the many consequences to the profession. It cannot shut its
eyes to the interests of the public, which is vitally affected whenever high
standards of ethical conduct are violated. Finally, the bar cannot dismiss the
fact that young men and women are spending three years of their lives in
specialized training who may be denied the right to use that training because
of overcrowding and attendant economic conditions. There is a terrific waste
in permitting a student to spend three years in law school and then have that
student unable to practice law after he has been admitted to the bar.
Surely the bar can find the answer to this situation if it will diligently
seek it. Surely the bar must diligently and conscientiously strive to find that
answer. Our obligations to the public and to the profession can permit no less.
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Bench and Bar Sponsoring Document
Institute August 25
On Thursday evening, August 25, there has been scheduled for the
benefit of the bench and bar of Colorado a seminar discussion concerning
the scientific examination of questioned documents conducted by leaders of
the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners. Judge J. Foster
Symes and Judge Orie L. Phillips are sponsors of the program and hosts for
the evening inasmuch as the seminar will be held in the United States District
Courtroom in the Post Office Building. The Institute Committee of the Denver
Bar Association is assisting in arrangements under the co-chairmanship of
Chas. H. Haines, Jr. and Wayne D. Williams.
Members of the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners
are holding their annual convention in Denver the week of August 22.
Membership in the society is limited to those scientifically trained experts who
devote their full time to document investigation. They are the elite of a highly
trained profession, numbering only twenty in the entire United States. There
is no local member.
As an incident of the convention in Denver, Mr. Clark Sellers of Los
Angeles, the president of the Society, has offered to arrange the program for
the evening meeting. Four members of the society will make successive fifteenminute, illustrated lectures to be followed by a discussion and question period
with the speakers and other members of the society. The first of the four
members of the panel will be Mr. Albert D. Osborn of New York who will
speak on "Scientific Principles of Handwriting Identification." Mr. Elbridge
W. Stein, also of New York, will discuss "Recent Scientific Methods: The
Use of Special Lights and Fluorescence." Mr. Charles C. Scott of Kansas
City, an attorney as well as a document expert and author of the book
"Photographic Evidence," will speak on the "Relation Between the Lawyer
and the Document Expert." Mr. John L. Harris of Los Angeles will speak
on "Typewritten Forgeries." Mr. Sellers will act as moderator of the panel
and coordinator for the question period.
Messrs. Osborn, Stein and Sellers were all experts in the trial of Bruno
Hauptmann. Their testimony provided the conclusive proof on. which the
Lindbergh kidnapping was solved. Mr. Sellers, who is perhaps the dean of the
profession, was the subject of a series of four articles in the Saturday Evening
Post which appeared from February 8 to March 21, 1947. The experts are,
of course, necessarily at home in the witness chair under cross examination.
Because of the importance of the subject to banks and peace officers as
well as to the bench and bar, special invitations are being extended by Judge
Symies and Judge Phillips to Denver banks and law enforcement units. Wives
are included in the invitation.
Further announcement will be made of the event, but the evening meeting of August 25 should be noted on your calendar.
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Motion For Publication of Summons In
Quiet Title Proceedings
By DONALD M. LESHER
of the Denver Bar
AUTHOR'S NOTE: In writing this article, the forms of motions used
by Edwin 1. Whittelshofer, L. H. Drath, Fairfield & Woods, Albert S.
Isbill, and Percy S. Morris were studied. The assistance of these title experts is gratefully acknowledged.

Too many motions for the publication of summons in quiet title proceedings in Colorado do not comply with the requirements of Rules 4 (g) (2)1
and 4(h) 2 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and result in substituted
service which does not confer jurisdiction upon the court and, consequently,
in quiet title decrees which are void and subject to collateral attack.
Changes in the law make every lawyer's basic knowledge of substantive
law and his procedural tools constantly subject to obsolescence, equally subject to improvement. The fact that the provisions of the Colorado Code permitting substituted service of process affecting actions in rem have been
changed is known to all practicing attorneys; unfortunately, however, this
change resulted in making obsolete the forms which lawyers, for years, had
been using to secure substituted service.

To an extent, many lawyers have

Rule 4:
(g) Other service. Service by mail or publication shall be allowed only in cases
affecting specific property or status or in other proceedings in rem ...
(2) Service by publication may be had on the following parties:

(i) Unknown persons.
(ii) Domestic corporations. When such corporation cannot be served because no

person can be found upon whom such service can be made.
(iii) Foreign corporations. When such corporation has not appointed a statutory
agent for process, or when the agent appointed cannot be found at the address

stated in such appointment.
(iv) Nonresidents of the state; persons who have departed from the state without
intention of returning; persons who conceal themselves to avoid service of process;
or persons whose whereabouts are unknown and who cannot be served by personal
service in the state.

' Rule 4 4h): Publication. The party desiring service of process by publication
shall file a motion vertified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an
order of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service, and shall show
the efforts, if any, that have been made to obtain personal service within this state and
shall give the address, or last known address, of each person to be served or shall state
that the same is unknown. The court shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that
due diligence has been used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to
obtain the same would have been to no avail, shall order publication of the process in a
newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. Such publication
shall be made for four weeks. Within 10 days after the order the clerk shall mail a copy
of the process to each person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall
be complete on the day of the last publication. If no newspaper be published in the
county, the court shall designate one in some adjoining county. (Effective 12/28/44
plus 60 days.)
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been reluctant to accept this obsolescence and to revise their office forms to
comply with the new rules.
Recognizing that in many quiet title actions there may be certain factual
peculiarities which should properly be included in a verified motion for publication and that a form will not fit every situation, there are certain statements which must be made in each such motion under Rule 4, and certain
statements considered essential under the old code which are no longer necessary. The omission of any of the requirements under the new rules is fatal;3
the inclusion of the former requirements is no longer good practice, but is
probably harmless, except that such inclusion may result in a motion which is
too long and wordy, accomplishes no good purpose, and tends to perpetuate
the evil.
It has been consistently held that in order to give the court jurisdiction
by substituted service through publication of summons, the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with, and that nothing excuses omissions or
insufficient statements. 4 Service by publication of summons is in derogation
of the common law, 5 and, if the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure
are not complied with, the court is without jurisdiction;6 any decree in such
cause is a nullity 7 and may be collaterally attacked.' A recitation in the
decree is not conclusive if the record discloses lack of jurisdiction. 9
The Requirements Under the Rules
Under Rule 4(h), the motion for publication:
(1) must state the facts authorizing substituted service; 1°
(2) must show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within the State of Colorado; 11
(3) must give the address, or last known address, of each person to be
served by publication, if the same may be ascertained; 12
(4) must state that the address, and last known address, of the persons
to be served are unknown, if such is the fact; 13 and
(5) must be verified by the party
desiring such substituted service or
4
by someone in his behalf.'
24 CA,514; 24 CA 517.
.:25
CA 129, 131.
15 Colo. 189.
e109 Colo. 567.
S23 CA 53; Sine v. Stout, decided 1/31/49.
822 CA 603; 23 CA 220; 48 Colo. 419.
S48 Colo. 419; 22 CA 612.
1
Sine v. Stout, decided 1/31/49.
" 67 Colo. 189.
122 CA 603; 22 CA 389; 146 So. 241 (Fla.); 91 ALR 212; 52 Colo. 512.
" 22 CA 389; 23 CA 206; 23 CA 344: 25 CA 129, all decided under the code,
to the effect that, if addresses are not given, it must be stated that all of the requirements
are unknown.
14 Rule4(h).
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The verified motion which contains all of the necessary elements in as
few words as possible eases the burden of the subsequent title examiner in his
search of the record and makes the proceedings themselves less subject to
criticism.
The lead paragraph of the motion could read as follows:
A. B., et al.,
Plaintiff,
Motion for Publication
vs.
C. D., et al.,
Defendant 15
Come(s) now the plaintiff(s) herein (by his attorney), and moves
for an order of service by publication in accordance with the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure (upon all of the defendants not otherwise
served with process),"6 and states:
Under the old code, 17 the affidavit could be made by the plaintiff or by
the plaintiff's attorney if the plaintiff did not reside in the county or was
absent from the county wherein the action was brought. Accordingly, no
other person could properly make the necessary affidavit, i8 and when it was
made by the attorney, reason had to be shown why the plaintiff himself did
not make it.' 9 The present rule changed this, however, by providing that the
motion shall be filed by the party desiring service by publication and verified
by the oath of such party or by someone in his behalf. The rule places importance on the fact that the statements are being verified by or in behalf of the
party desiring the substituted summons; the reasons why the party himself
is not making or verifying the motion are immaterial, if such be the fact.
Rule 4(g) should be closely followed in stating the facts authorizing
the service. A paragraph including this requirement might be briefly stated
as follows:
(1) That such service is authorized because:
This is an action affecting specific property (as described in the
complaint) 20 and is a proceeding in rem;21
The defendants to be served by publication are unknown persons,
(or are domestic corporations which cannot be served) because no perRule 10(a) provides that in pleadings other than the complaint, it is sufficient to
state the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
" May be omitted for brevity.
"Code, Sec. 45.
Is 22 CA 605, 127 P. 123.
"4 CA 482; 25 CA 391.
"May be used by the fastidious lawyer who feels that a reference to the property
must be made in each pleading; it, however, seems unnecessary in the motion for publication under the present rules.
2"The phrase, "known as an action in rem," is not used in the rules of procedure,
but appears in the code.
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son can be found upon whom service can be made,) 2 (or are foreign
corporations which have not appointed an agent for process who can
be found at the address stated in such appointment,)" (or are nonresidents of the State of Colorado) 22 (or have departed from the State
without intention of returning,)22 or are persons whose whereabouts
are unknown and who cannot be served by personal service in the
3
State of Colorado."
A common error is to presume that the statement that the whereabouts
of the defendant are unknown and that he cannot be served by personal service
in the state will apply to corporations; it has been held, however, that a domestic corporation cannot be absent from the state, nor can it conceal itself to
avoid service of process. 24 Likewise, the provisions of Rule 4(g) (2) (iii),
applying to foreign corporations, should be closely followed in applicable
instances.

Grounds For Service By Publication
Although grounds for service by publication may be stated in the disjunctive,2 5 the attorney should use care to state all applicable grounds.
The efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within this
state may, in order to avoid extreme verbosity, be stated in general terms
inclusive of the attorney's investigations, such as the following:
(2) That search has been made of the County Court and other
public records of the----------------County,26 State of Colorado, and of
the telephone and other available directories of ------------------------County, State of Colorado; various inquiries have been made from
persons who might have information concerning defendents' addresses;
endeavors have been made to personally serve defendants at any addresses available; but said efforts and farther efforts to obtain personal
service within this state 27 have been to no avail.
The sheriff's non est return is no longer necessary, setting forth the
efforts he has made to obtain service and the reason for his failure. This was
formerly required by Rule 14a of the Supreme Court Rules but became
obsolete with the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Probably the most troublesome requirement is that the address, or last
known address, of each person to be served shall be given, or the motion shall
state that the same is unknown. This requirement is troublesome because:
22Should be omitted where inapplicable.
2

lnasmuch as Rule 4(g)(2)(iv) contemplates residence and service within the
state, a statement that the defendants cannot be found within the county does not strictly
comply therewith.
'25 CA 129.
'25 CA 129; 67 Colo. 189; 53 Colo. 346.
Only the records of the county in which the action is brought need be searched.
84 Colo. 459.
" Personal service must be made, however, if possible within the state.
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(a) In instances where the defendant is possessed of a common
name, such as John Johnson (15 shown in the Denver telephone directory, to say nothing of 26 J. Johnsons), it may be very difficult to
determine whether or not the defendant can be located;
(b) Sufficient care is not taken, at times, to determine addresses
available from recorded title records, from the treasurer's and assessor's
records, from the County Court records, from available directories, or
from other sources-so that even though it may be stated that the ad28
dresses, or last known addresses, are unknown, such is not the fact;
(c) Many lawyers refuse to accept the obsolescence (and danger)
of the allegation, formerly required by the code, that the "addresses,
residences, whereabouts, and post office addresses of the defendants are
unknown to the affiant."
When the present rule 4(h) was drafted, the provision that the motion
shall give the address, or last known address, of each person to be served
or shall state that the same is unknown," added a new requirement: that of
the last-known address; and eliminated the necessity of stating the residence
and whereabouts. 2 9 Obviously, "address" and "last known address" do not
mean the same thing. Webster's dictionary has defined "address": "The
directions for delivery of a letter; the name or description of a place of residence, business, etc.. where a person may be found or communicated with." 30
Although not necessarily a defendant's residence, 3 1 an address, as used in
rule 4(h), is a direction at which or through which a person may be presently
32
located.
The rule then provides, in effect, that if it is not known where the defendant can be located at that time, the most recently available direction must
be stated; hence, the phrase: last known address. A statement that no "address" is known is a simple allegation that no direction is known through which
the defendant may, at the present time, be located. It states nothing whatsoever about the last address known (at some time in the past) for the defendant. An allegation that "the residence, address, whereabouts, and post office
address" of the defendant are unknown is not a statement, as required, that the
last known address is unknown. It must be stated that the address and the
last known address are both unknown, if such is the fact.
' Under former code, sec. 45, it was sufficient if the affidavit stated that the residence, whereabouts, and postoffice address were unknown to the affiant. In construing
a requirement similar to ours, however, it was said in Glenn v. Holub, 36 F. Supp.
941, 942, that "the plaintiff is required to ascertain at his peril, the last known address
of the defendant as a matter of fact." (See also: 154 A 255; 57 NE (2) 819; 211 NW
916, 57 ALR 1218). Any failure to determine a last known address, when one is available, will, accordingly, result in a failure to comply with the rule.
If the grounds for the substituted service is that the defendants "cannot be served
by personal service in the state," it must be stated that the whereabouts are unknown.
140 P. (2) 990, 992 (Calif. 1943).
31 164 P. (2) 274 (Calif., 1945); 52 Colo. 512; 23 CA 344; 22 CA
389; 51 Colo.
115; 23 CA 555.
" 50 NE (2) 633 (Mass., 1943).

DICTA

"Address" and "Last Known Address"
The distinction between an "address" and a "last known address" is
made in Curtiss Candy Co. v. Finance Corp., 71 SW (2) 833, 838, (Mo.,
1934), in which it was said: "There is a material difference between the
terms 'known' and 'last known', as applied to addresses...." The Missouri
court defines "address" as a place "at which the debtor could be found at
the time", and holds that a last known address and an address are terms
with entirely different legal meanings.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Rosenheim (1942), 132 F. (2)
677, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit further distinguished
"address" from "last known address" by determining that a requirement that
a notice of transferee liability must be mailed to the person subject to the
tax at his last known address was complied with if the notice was directed
to the last address disclosed by the books of the transferor company. The
court conceded that this was not the respondent's address and that this fact
was evidenced by income tax returns for four years, but held that it would
be unreasonable and illogical, when the act specified "last known address",
to require the Commissioner to search for a different address from that appearing on the books of the company.
The requirements of the rule can, accordingly, be complied with by the
following allegation:
(3) That certain of the defendants may be deceased, but the
addressees, or last known addresses, of the following defendants are
as hereinafter stated:
and that the address, and last known address, of each person to be
served, including unknown parties, is unknown except as herein
stated.
Some lawyers deem it wise to add a paragraph similar to the following:
Said addresses are given as the last known addresses based upon
inquiries and investigations made by Plaintiffs, and are stated as the
last known addresses regardless of other or different addresses which
may be shown by the public records.
It may be questioned, however, whether or not this paragraph is of any
effect in view of the decisions construing statutes similar to the Colorado rule
as placing a burden on the person desiring the substituted service to ascertain,
83
at his peril, the last known address of the defendant as a matter of fact.
The rule does not require the last address known to the plaintiff, but simply:
the last known address.
" See footnote 28.
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Verification
The verification of the motion for publication could be as follows:
State of Colorado
ss

County of

J

.............................................---being first duly sworn,

upon oath deposes and says: that he is the attorney for and makes
this verification in behalf of the above-named plaintiffs; that he has
read and knows the contents of the foregoing motion; and that the
34
facts therein stated are true of his own knowledge.
Subscribed and sw orn to before m e ----------------------------It has been the purpose of this article to discuss the various statements
which should be contained in a motion for publication of summons in actions
in rem. Some of the points discussed are controversial; there has been an
attempt, however, to compromise any known controversies with statements
which seem to satisfy all arguments. It will be noted that the paragraphs in
italics above, when executed, will form a Motion for Publication. Some words
probably could be eliminated, but it is believed that none of the essential
elements have been omitted. Some sign-posts have been placed at points of
obvious importance-these probably are unnecessary, but will serve as an aid
to the subsequent title examiner.

Judge Murrah To Speak at October Convention
The Honorable Alfred P. Murrah of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has agreed to join his distinguished colleague from the Second Circuit, Judge
Charles E. Clark, on the roster of speakers for the 51st annual convention of
the Colorado Bar Association in Colorado Springs on October 13, 14 and 15.
Judge Murrah will address the Saturday luncheon meeting on October 15.
The subject of his speech as yet has not been announced.
Other developments in the rapidly-filling program of the three day convention point to an interesting institute on Friday afternoon, October 14
under the auspices of the American Law Institute. Subject of the institute
is "small business organizations." The various forms of business organization
and their tax consequences will be discussed. Several lectures will be given
on the organization and operation of small business corporations.
Leslie A. Gifford, formerly located in the University Building, has
opened an office at 9355 E. Colfax, Aurora.
In 25 CA 129, an affidavit for publication which was made on information and
belief was held not to comply with the requirements of the law for that reason. A verification should, accordingly, be made positively and not on information and belief.
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Purchase and Sale of Corporate AssetsSome Income Tax Dangers
By

FLOYD K. HASKELL
of the Denver Bar

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is the text of an address given by Mr. Haskell before
the Denver Law Club on May 9, 1949.

The problem which I wish to discuss concerns the income tax dangers
present when stockholders determine to dispose of an incorporated business.
The problem is essentially one of avoiding double taxation and exists, though
in varying degrees, whether a sale of assets or a sale of stock is effected.
By double taxation I mean, of course, that the profit is first taxed to the
corporation and then to the stockholders. Although the problem is basically
the same whether there be few or many stockholders and whether the corporation owns one or many types of assets, I should like to illustrate the problem using the simplest possible example. Let us assume that Mr. Jones is the
sole stockholder and president of the Jones Hotel Company. A hotel is the
company's sole asset. The fair market value of the hotel is $200,000.00; the
hotel has a depreciated cost on the books of the company of $100,000.00; and
the cost basis of Mr. Jones's stock is $50,000.00. If the corporation sells the
hotel and liquidates the proceeds the tax bill will be approximately $19,000.00
more than if Mr. Jones sells the hotel individually. Obviously, therefore, it
will be well worthwhile for Mr. Jones to devise a method whereby he can
sell the hotel individually.
Presuming he cannot find a buyer for his stock, there are three general
ways, other than having the corporation give a deed, by which the sale can
be effected. First, the general manager or some other third party could be
appointed liquidating trustee to receive the corporate assets, sell the hotel,
pay off the debts and distribute the net proceeds t6 Jones. However, since the
regulations provide that a sale by liquidating trustees is a sale by the corporation
this method must be discarded.' The second is for Mr. Jones, while the corporation has title to the hotel, to contract as an individual stockholder to sell
the hotel. Once the contract is signed he can liquidate the company and fulfill his obligation. The third method would be for Mr. Jones to liquidate the
corporation, operate the hotel in his individual name, and then look around
for a purchaser. This probably would not appeal to Mr. Jones very much for
he would be concerned about his individual liability.
Whether, and under what circumstances, either of these methods will
accomplish the desired result is the real problem. The answer depends upon
which of two fundamental tax principles the courts will apply.
The first principle is that taxpayers may employ all legal means to minimize taxes. Or to state it differently, when there are various methods of
'Reg.

111, Sec. 29.22(a)-20.
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effecting a transaction, a taxpayer is not compelled to adopt the most expensive method taxwise. The second principle is that tax liability will be
controlled by substance not form and that courts will look through a series
of transactions to the end result in determining tax liability.
The Court Holding Company Case
With this preface I would like now to consider the leading case on the
sale of corporate assets-Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding
Company, 324 U. S. 331, decided by the Supreme Court in 1945. In that
case one Miller and his wife owned all the stock of the Court Holding Company, whose sole asset was an apartment house. Negotiations were entered
into by Miller for the sale of the apartment house by the corporation. All
terms and conditions were agreed upon with the purchaser. However, when
the parties met to reduce the contract to writing the purchaser was informed
that the corporation could not make the sale because of prohibitive taxes. At
this point, since the agreement had not been reduced to writing there was no
binding contract under Florida law. The next day the corporation was liquidated and a sales contract was entered between Miller and his wife as individuals and the same prospective purchaser. This contract embodied substantially the same terms as the proposed contract for sale on behalf of the
corporation. The Tax Court held that as a matter of substance the corporation made the sale and should therefore pay a tax on the profit. This decision
was ultimately sustained by the Supreme Court.
Instead of clearing the air and settling the law in this field the Supreme
Court's opinion muddied the waters. The issue, as stated by the Supreme
Court, was whether "the findings of the Tax Court that the whole transaction showed a sale by the corporation rather than by the stockholders were
final and binding upon the Circuit Court of Appeals." The court held that
there was "evidence to support the findings of the Tax Court, and its findings must therefore be accepted by the courts." The court cited Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489. This case, decided by the Supreme Court in
1943, accorded special finality to decisions of the Tax Court. If the Supreme
Court had said no more, the Court Holding Company case would clearly be
just another application of the Dobson rule. However, the Court went further.
It said:
"The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from the sale of
property are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed
to transfer title ... To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalities which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Con2
gress."
2324 U. S. 331 at 332.
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As a result there are, in my opinion, three equally plausible interpretations of the decision. First, it may be interpreted merely as an application
of the Dobson rule. If so, dissatisfied taxpayers could go to the District Courts
and try again. Secondly, the negotiations on behalf of the corporation could
be interpreted as the controlling factor. Thirdly, the case could stand for the
broad proposition that when a purchaser desires to buy corporate assets and
when these assets are ultimately sold to this purchaser who has contacted the
corporation, corporate tax liability cannot be defeated by having the sale
effected by the stockholders.
Is Legal Tax Minimization Now Possible?
If the third interpretation is the rule of the case, the principle of legal
tax minimization is virtually a thing of the past. For here is a perfect situation for the application of this principle. There are two ways in which the
transaction may be effected. The corporation can make the sale and liquidate
the proceeds to the stockholders; or the stockholders may liquidate the corporation, pay a capital gains tax and then sell the assets. The second interpretation is hard to swallow; for though Mr. Jones may intend to ell only as an
individual, nevertheless an unguarded remark to the effect that we (meaning
the corporation) will do such and such, might be sufficient to find negotiations
by the corporation, thus a sale by the corporation, and therefore an additional
tax liability of $19,000.00.
Lawyers are not the only ones who are confused by the Court Holding
decision. The Circuit Courts are by no means in accord as to the proper in
terpretation of Court Holding Company. Time will only permit the mention
of two cases--one in the Fifth Circuit and one in the Tenth. The Fifth Circuit case apparently adopts a combination of the first and second interpretations. The Tenth Circuit, unfortunately, appears to lean towards the third
interpretation. 3
The Tenth Circuit case is XVichita Terminal Elevator Company v. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 162 Fed. 2d 513, decided in 1947. The
stock of the Wichita Company was held by one Powell and his family. Powell
was getting along in years and desired to dispose of the business. He showed
the corporate properties to one Ross and on the succeeding day a stockholders'
meeting was held at which dissolution of the corporation was authorized. A
few days after this meeting the stockholders executed powers of attorney to
Powell authorizing him to receive the properties in liquidation, to pay corporate debts, and to sell the properties. Powell subsequently entered into a
contract with Ross and conveyed the properties to him "as agent for the
stockholders."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court and held that the properties
For two very recent cases adopting respectively The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth
Circuit approaches, see Curmberland Public Service Co. v. U. S ...... Fed. 2d _.. (U. S.
Ct. Cl., 5/2/49) and Kauffman v. CIR .-..
Fed. 2d .
(CCA 3, 4/26/49).
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had been sold by the corporation. The Court's opinion dwelt at some length
on the Dobson rule and then stated:
"Viewed rationally the facts and circumstances as a whole reasonably lend themselves to the conclusion that from -beginning to end the
successive steps taken were merely integral parts of a unified operation
having as its goal the sale and passing4 of title of the corporation through
a conduit to the ultimate purchaser."1
Judge Huxman concurred and stated that in his opinion Powell was a liquidating trustee. A dissent was written by Judge Phillips.
Reconsideration In Tenth Circuit Possible
In the light of this case, what advice could you give to Mr. Jones? In
my opinion the only conservative advice would be to tell Mr. Jones to liquidate
the corporation, operate the hotel as an individual and then look around for
a purchaser. Furthermore if there were additional stockholders and it was
necessary to appoint one as agent for the others, the agency document would
have to be drawn with great care so that there would be no question but that
the agent was agent for the stockholders and not a liquidating trustee. In
drawing this document you might refer to U. S. v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation, 166 Fed. 2d 17, a 1948 Sixth Circuit case where the taxpayer successfully contended that the liquidating agent was the agent of the stockholders and not the agent of the corporation.
Suppose Mr. Jones came into your office and told you that he had already sold the hotel and that he had done so by contracting, as a stockholder
but while the corporation was still in existence, to sell the properties. Should
you advise him that his case was hopeless and that he might as well pay the
corpor-ate tax? In my opinion you should not. In the first place there was a
dissent in the Wichita case. Secondly, and far more important, the court
leaned heavily on the Dobson rule which has since been eliminated by Congress. 5 Therefore, the way is clear for the Tenth Circuit to reconsider the
entire matter.
On the whole, however, Mr. Jones would feel much happier if he was in
the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Howell Turpentine
Company v. Commissioner, 162 Fed. 2d 319, decided in 1947, adopts an entirely
different approach. In the Howell case, 95 % of the company's stock was owned
by a father and two sons. The company had granted options in 1937, 1939 and
1940, for the sale of its properties. The last option expired August 9, 1940.
Shortly after this date the father and sons, being the the sole directors, resolved that the corporation should not attempt to sell the lands but should
be liquidated. On August 25, 1940, the father approached the ultimate pur, 162 Fed. 2d 513 at 516.
' Sec. 1141 (a), I. R. C., as amended by Public Law 773, Section 36, effective September 1, 1948.
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chaser and offered the lands for sale. This offer was accepted and the attorneys involved were directed to draw a contract of sale. On September 6, 1940,
the stockholders met and resolved to liquidate the corporation. Later in the
day following this meeting, they met with the purchaser and signed a contract
as individuals reciting that they would individually convey the lands now
owned by the corporation.

Fifth Circuit Reverses Tax Court
The Fifth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, held that the sale had been
made by the stockholders as individuals and not by the corporation. The
court gave the following grounds for its decision. First, an individual can
contract to sell property that he does not at the time own. Second, merely
because the father was president of the corporation did not mean that he
had to act for the corporation and that he could not act for himself and his sons
as stockholders. Third, the corporation had the choice of either selling the
assets and paying the debts or liquidating the assets in kind to the stockholders
subject to the debts. Fourth, that the method adopted was dictated by a tax
saving motive was no objection to it. Fifth, Court Holding was distinguished
on the grounds that here no negotiations were entered into on behalf of the
corporation.
Two concurring opinions were written and in the second the following
significant statement is found:
"To reach a contrary conclusion the Court would have to hold that
title in the corporation is of itself sufficient to warrant a finding that
negotiations by and on behalf of the stockholders looking to a sale of
property passing to them in liquidation is for tax purposes a corporate
sale." 6
The Fifth Circuit's approach seems far more realistic than does the
approach of the Tenth Circuit. However, let us hope that now that the
Dobson case is no longer law the Tenth Circuit will see fit to reconsider the
subject.
The second aspect of this subject involves a situation where, to minimize
taxes, stock is sold and the purchaser who is interested solely i2 the corporate
assets liquidates shortly after the stock transfer. In other words, suppose
Mr. Jones sells his stock to Smith, who has tried unsuccessfully to buy the
hotel from the company. Mr. Smith immediately after the purchase liquidates
the company. Can the Commissioner successfully assert a corporate tax on
the profit? On the whole, taxpayers have been more successful when they
employed this tax minimization device. A recent case where such a transaction was sustained is Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T. C. No. 17,
decided by the Tax Court in January of this year. However, as indicated by
the dissenting opinion of Judge Harlan, there exists a difference of opinion

a 162 Fed. 2d 319 at 326.
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within the Tax Court as to what circumstances call for an application of the
Court Holding result. Therefore care must be used in effecting the transaction.
Although in the Dallas case there had been, prior to the sale of the stock,
negotiations for the sale of assets on behalf of the corporation, nevertheless
it would be safer not to sell the stock to anyone who had negotiated for the
assets. This would be especially true in Mr. Jones' case where there is but
one stockholder and where this stockholder is also president of the corporation.
Furthermore, before drawing the contract for sale of the stock, CIR v.
Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 99 Fed. 2d 588, decided by the Sixth Circuit
in 1938, should be examined. This case involved a situation where the purchaser of the stock had previously attempted to buy the oil lands owned
by the corporation. The stock purchase contract provided that the accounts
receivable and the equipment should be reserved to the selling stockholders.
As a result the purchaser, though buying stock, got only the oil lands. After
completing the stock purchase, the new owner liquidated the corporation. The
Sixth Circuit held that there had been a sale of assets by the corporation.
Although the issue in this case was whether the purchaser realized gain upon
liquidation, the same principle would be applicable if tax liability had been
asserted against the corporation.

Why Sale of Stock Method Not Always Feasible
Since taxpayers have had better luck in the sale of stock cases, why not
always sell stock? The answer is that a purchaser willing to buy assets might
refuse to buy stock on the grounds that if he bought stock he would take
the corporate assets subject to unknown as well as known liabilities. The
seller could, of course, guarantee the corporate balance sheet but this might
not satisfy the purchaser.
If the purchaser is a corporation, there might be an additional reason
for refusing to buy stock. In the Jones case, for instance, the corporate purchaser, after liquidation, would be bound to use as a basis for depreciation
$100,000.00, the amount at which the properties were held upon the books
of the Jones Corporation, and not $200,000.00, the amount paid for the stock.
This result is required by Section 112(b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code.
This section provides that when a corporate stockholder owning more than
80% of the subsidiary's stock at the time the resolution to liquidate is
adopted liquidates the subsidiary, the transaction is tax-free and therefore
the parent corporation must use the subsidiary's cost basis for the properties.
Under certain circumstances, however, this section will work to the
advantage of a corporate purchaser. Suppose the Jones Corporation's hotel
was worth $100,000.00 but had a cost basis of $200,000.00. A corporate
purchaser who bought Mr. Jones' stock for $100,000.00 could liquidate
and use $200,000.00 as a depreciation base.
Before entering into such a transaction a corporate purchaser should
consider Section 129. This section in effect provides that where the principal
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purpose of any such transaction is to secure a tax advantage, the advantage
will not be allowed.
I regret that due to time limitations I have been able only to highlight
the subject. There exists an ever-growing body of case law on the problem
and in my opinion, because of its intensely practical nature and because it
represents a major battleground, it is one of the most interesting contemporary problems in the federal income tax field.

Random Comments on Aeronautical Law
By LEANDER I. SHELLEY
of the New Tork Bar
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is the text of an address-given by Mr.
Shelley, General Counsel of the Port of New Tork Authority, before the
May 2 meeting of the Denver Bar Association. In the preparation of the
text, Mr. Shelley wishes to acknowledge the aid and assistance of Mr.
Daniel B. Goldberg, senior attorney of the law department of the Port
Authority.

Mr. Chairman, Officers of the Association, Honored Guests and Fellow
Lawyers:
I speak in all sincerity when I say that I feel deeply honored at having
the opportunity to address you today.
It is my impression that the people in your section of the country are in
many respects more advanced than are we of the Eastern Seaboard. I am
thinking particularly in terms of aviation. With your greater distances and
greater spaces it is my impression that you accept air travel as a much more
normal incident of your everyday life than we do. We in the East live in the
small close country, and to many of us a trip by air takes on the atmosphere

of an adventure. I am under the impression that the people of Denver and
the surrounding country are apt to take a trip by air as casually as we take
the subway.
If my impression is correct then aviation law should be a topic of direct
and immediate interest to you all. With the increase in aviation there are
bound to be many legal cases involving aviation law. I feel that the chances
of you as lawyers in this city having cases in that field are much greater than
are those of the lawyers on the Eastern Seaboard.
I trust that you will pardon me if I confine my remarks upon aviation law
primarily to questions arising in connection with airports-since those are
the questions with which I am most familiar.
At the outset let me say that it is an interesting thing that Congress has
not established any regulatory body having control over the rates and practices of airports. The railroads, the motor trucks, the motor buses and to
some degree the steamships are subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The airlines are subject to regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
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The Maritime Commission has jurisdiction over piers and wharves and to
some extent over steamship lines. But there is no comparable federal regulation
of airports.
I like to feel that this failure on the part of Congress to regulate airport
rates and practices is due to some degree to the fact that airports are largely
operated by the states and cities, and that the people actually managing them
-the airport managers-are doing their best to do so in the public interest.
An outstanding example of the type of airport manager which I have in
mind-an airport manager who is doing a good and efficient job in the public
interest-is the manager of the Stapleton Air Field, your own airport here
in Denver-Mr. Charles J. Lowen. So long as men like him operate our air
fields, there will be no need for setting up any federal regulatory body.

Airports Subject to Indirect Federal Regulation
While no federal regulatory body has been created, our airports are
nevertheless subject to a certain degree of indirect regulation. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, both predicated
upon the commerce clause, directly regulate aircraft operators. They indirectly
control airports by refusing to permit aircraft operators to use airports which
fail to meet federal safety requirements dictated under the Civil Aeronautics

Act.
From this initial indirect regulation of airport safety standards the Federal Government proceeded under the Federal Airport Aid Act of 1946 to
exercise certain indirect controls over the operating policies of airports.
Federal grants were offered for development of airports, but the grants were
contingent upon compliance with various conditions. In general the requirement is that the airport be operated as a public utility and without undue
discrimination as between users.
The lack of direct federal regulation of airports should not be construed
as resulting from a lack of power in Congress. Although airports in this
country are generally owned by municipalities and private operators and not
by the air carriers, it seems clear that airports are merely the terminal facilities

at the ends of air routes just as wharves and piers are the terminals for water
carriers. And in this related field of water transportation it is well settled
that the terminal facilities are instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce and subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause, even
though such piers and wharves are operated by independent wharfingers and

not by the water carriers themselves.
In the case of piers and wharves, the Shipping Act, Sections 16 and 17,
makes it unlawful for any operator thereof to give any undue or unreasonable

preferences, and requires the wharfinger to establish, observe and enforce just
and reasonable rates, classifications or regulations.
The federal regulatory power under the commerce clause applies to cities

and other public agencies as well as to private corporations. This was settled
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in two cases between the United States and the State of California. In the
earlier case,1 the Supreme Court upheld regulation of a belt line terminal
railroad operated by the State of California in San Francisco. The state was
required to observe the Federal Safety Appliance Act which applies to all
railroads in interstate commerce. Although the terminal railroad was wholly
within the State of California, its use as a link in the through transportation
of interstate freight sustained federal regulation.
In the second California case, 2 the Supreme Court sustained the Maritime Commission's power under the Shipping Act to order the cessation by
the state and the City of Oakland of certain practices in connection with
public piers and wharves.
Airport Regulation by Treaty
While no federal regulatory body has been set up over airports, federal
regulation of airports at the present time also exists to some extent by reason
of treaties with foreign nations of which the most important is the "Convention on International Civil Aviation", commonly called the Chicago Convention, effective since April, 1947. Article 15 forbids discrimination against
foreign carriers based on nationality.
The International Civil Aviation Organization, established under the
Chicago Convention, is now considering the entire problem of landing fees
at international airports. In September 1948 the Air Cordinating Committee
of the C.A.A. submitted its draft of the proposed United States position on
the subject. The principle was proposed that since the capital, operation, and
maintenance costs of the landing areas are so large, charges cannot be expected
to meet these costs in full, and, therefore, should be placed at levels that
will only meet operating costs and yield nothing against capital costs.
We at The Port of New York Authority argued to the committee that
no fixed and detailed formula for the computation of airport charges should
be spelled out either by treaty or by I.C.A.O., but it should merely be provided in general terms that the charges imposed should be fair and reasonable
under all of the circumstances of the particular case. The Port Authority
feels that landing fees should include amortization of capital construction
costs as well as covering costs of operation and maintenance. Indeed, any
attempt by Congress to prevent airports from making compensatory charges
might raise a constitutional question under the provision of the Federal Constitution forbidding the taking of property without just compensation.
The Port Authority also urged that if fair and reasonable airport charges
might exceed the reasonable maximum ability of international air carriers to
pay for the services, the difference should be covered by a federal subsidy
rather than compelling the local agency to absorb the cost. I am hopeful that
'United States v. California,
2California v. United States,

297 U. S. 175 (1936).
320 U. S. 577 (1943).
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these principles will be advocated by the representatives of the United States
at the next meeting of I.C.A.O. next month.

Who Owns The Air Space?
Let me now turn to one of the most vexing legal problems resulting from
the Wright Brothers' invention. What right does your aircraft have to fly over
my property? Or, contrariwise, what right do I, as a property owner, have
to interfere with your flight operations by building on my property? Who
owns the air space anyway? The law on this point has not yet crystallized.
Before air commerce became an actuality the courts repeatedly asserted
by way of dictum that the owner of the land had unlimited ownership of
all of the air space up to the heavens. This dictum is obviously inconsistent
with the realities of aviation. It was rejected outright by the Supreme Court
in the Causby case in 1946. 3 The modern rule is that there is a privilege on
the part of the public, or perhaps an easement, for travel in a reasonable
manner and at such height as will not interfere unreasonably with the land
owner's use of the surface and the space above it. 4 On this point, there
appear to be two variations. One group of cases appear to divide the air
space into two horizontal zones, with ownership of the lower stratum
only, being in the land owner, the public owning the upper stratum. The
limit of this lower stratum is sometimes said to be determined by the area
of "possible effective possession" on the part of the land owner. This theory
is exemplified by a Massachusetts case, 5 in which it was held that flights at
about 100 feet over a tract covered with dense brush and woods were within
the area of effective possession and constituted a trespass. In a subsequent
Ohio case (1932) it was stated that the land owner "has a dominant right
of occupancy * * * of the lower stratum which he may reasonably expect to
6
occupy himself."1
The other theory of air space ownership holds that so much of the space
above ground is owned as is actually occupied or made use of in connection
with the enjoyment of the surface. Under this view, harmless low flying does
not constitute a trespass since "the air, like the sea, is incapable of private
ownership except insofar as one may actually use it."17 This view permits the
land owner to expand his ownership of the air space by building higher at
some future time; it rejects the idea that his failure to use it in the meanwhile
may create an easement by prescription in the public. This view appeals to me
as being more just to the land owner.
The Supreme Court opinion in the Causby case is consistent with either
the potential or actual use theories.
Causby v. United States, 328 U. S. 256.
'See Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 159, comment f;- and section 194.
'Smith v. New England Aircraft Corp., 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
SSwetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation,55 F. (2d) 201 (CCA6 Ohio 1932).
'Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F. (2) 755 (1936).
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Indeed, under any theory the land owner does not have to own the
air space over his land to have a remedy against anyone actually interfering
with his enjoyment of the surface as distinguished from mere technical trespass. Here the law of nuisance comes into play.
When Is An Airport A Nuisance?
There are many cases dealing with the question whether an airport constitutes a nuisance as against adjacent land owners.
The cases fall in two classes. The first class consists of those in which it
is sought to enjoin the establishment of a new airport on the ground that an
airport is per se a nuisance. The second class consists of cases against operators
of existing airports complaining of the nature of the operation.
Of the five cases during the last decade in which it was attempted to
enjoin the establishment of a new airport, not one granted such an injunction,8
although an early case in 1932 did grant the relief.
refused in Pennsylvania, 9 Ohio, 10 New Jersey,"
Injunctions have been
12 and Georgia. 13
Florida,
As the Pennsylvania court said:
"There is nothing in the construction of an airfield, or in the
necessary consequences of its normal operation in an agricultural district to create a nuisance."
The Florida court imposed a condition in its decree which required the
city operating the airport to staff a control tower to enforce its rules and
regulations.
Of course there is no such uniformity in cases complaining of airports
in existence since in that case the question is whether the airport is so operated
as to constitute an actual nuisance. Injunctions against injurious operations
were granted during the last few years in New Jersey, 14 Arizona, 15 and
16
Delaware.
On the other hand a Pennsylvania court refused to grant such an injunction in a similar case,17 stating:
"Ina sense, the science or business of aviation is a new and growing business, essential to the needs of the public for commercial as well
'A 1932 case, quite ancient in this field, did grant such an injunction. Swetland
v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (CCA 6 Ohio 1932).
'Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Penn. 541, 58 A. (2d) 179 (1948).
"Antonik v. Chamberland, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. (2d) 752 (1947).
0echsle v. Ruhl, 140 N. J. Eq. 355, 54 A. (2d) 462 (1947).
2
Brooks v. Patterson, 31 So. (2d) 472 (1947),
S Elder v. City of Weider, 40 S.E. (2d) 659 (1946).
' 4 Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., 2 Avi. 14,755 (1948).
SBrandes v. Mitterling, 2 Avi. 14,686 (1948).
"Vanderslice v. Shawn, 27 A. (2d) 87 (Del. Ch. 1942).
"Rhoades v. Piacitelli, 2 Avi. 14,658 (1948).
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as military purposes. The courts have long adhered to the policy of
adapting the law to the economic and essential needs of the times.
While there is a contrariety of opinion on the point, we feel the
public interest is a factor in the decision of this case."
The factual situations in all these cases varied. But almost all showed
a tendency to balance the equities-to consider the extent to which the adjacent land owner- suffered interference and the importance of the airport
to the community. Most of the cases upholding charges of nuisance involved
small air fields used not as commercial terminals for public use but for flying
schools or clubs or the personal planes of the air field owner. The major airports used by air carrier transportation systems and open to public use have
more successfully resisted nuisance actions against them.
Zoning For Airport Protection
Airport zoning is somewhat the reverse of the situations which have
just been mentioned. It is an attempt to protect the airport against what
may be called "the nuisance" of structures adjacent to it which imperil the
operations of aircraft. As a matter of fact almost that very theory is being
pressed in a pending case in the Federal District Court in New York.' 8 The
operator of a private airport on Long Island has brought an action to enjoin
the construction of a water tower which would project into the airport approach zone established by the C.A.A. There is no airport zoning in the
case, but the airport operator is arguing that the C.A.A. regulations and
glide angles themselves constitute a regulation of the height to which adjacent land owners may build upon their land.
The constitutionality of airport zoning proper has not yet been passed
upon definitely by the United States Supreme Court. A New Jersey court
held by way of dictum that a city may not under the guise of an airport
zoning ordinance constitutionally avoid paying for the property needed for
the airport.' 9
An earlier Maryland case 20 squarely held an airport zoning ordinance
unconstitutional where the regulations limited the height of structures to five
feet in some areas of a particular tract. The court said that such regulations
do not promote the general public interest, but only benefit those who use air
transportation facilities.
A viewpoint in favor of the validity of such airport zoning regulation is
suggested by a Federal District Court decision in Louisiana. 2' There the
existence of an airport zoning ordinance was held to justify an award of "no
dollars" in a federal condemnation proceeding to acquire an easement for air
"8Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead.
" Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A. (2d) 559
(1945).
' Mutual Chemical Company v. Baltimore, 1 Avi. 804 (Circuit Ct. Baltimore, 1939).
21United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (1944).
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navigation ranging from twenty-five feet to forty-five feet above the land in
question.
In conclusion I must emphasize that the law regarding ownership of air
space and the respective rights therein of land owners and aircraft operators
is still in the formative stage. Ultimately the controlling decisions will be
made by the Supreme Court of the United States, but they have yet to be
made. As lawyers, some of us now present may well have the opportunity
of helping to formulate the principles of law which are ultimately adopted
by the arguments which we present in future cases, whether on behalf of the
aircraft operators, airport operators or private land owners.
I trust you will understand, therefore, that what I have said is not intended as an expression of definite opinion as to aviation law. Rather, I have
attempted to suggest lines of thought which may prove of some value in cases
which may arise.

Addendum To Report on General Assembly
By

HUBERT

D.

HENRY

of the Denver Bar

The article appearing on page 105 of the May 1949 issue of DICTA was
hastily prepared at the conclusion of the legislative session and contains a
few errors.
H. B. 48, relating to gas conservation, was not passed as reported on
page 110 but was defeated in the Senate. This reduces the number of bills
passed -from 264 to 263 and increases the number of printed bills killed by 1.
On page 112 at the bottom of the page is listed H. B. 578, providing
for the issuance of free motor vehicle licenses to amputee veterans. This
number is incorrect, the correct number of the bill being H. B. 958.
Nine bills passed by the two houses were vetoed by Governor Knous.
These bills are: S. B. 218, eliminating the $5 a day statutory limit on expenses of district judges sitting outside their own counties, H. B. 709, increasing fees paid by barbers to the barber's board, S. B. 484, prohibiting
discrimination in insurance rates in workmen's compensation and employer's
liability insurance, S. B. 622, providing a new procedure for the removal of
county seats, H. B. 909, permitting the motor vehicle department to issue
a probationary license to a person who has been convicted of a first offense
while driving under the influence of alcohol, H. B. 334, increasing the debt
limit of school districts, S. B. 617, regarding the control of beaver, H. B. 949,
giving to insurance passing in trust for designated beneficiaries the same ex"
emption from inheritance taxation that it has if it passes directly to such
beneficiaries, H. B. 674, permitting an assistant pharmacist to become a registered pharmacist after 8 years instead of after 10 years.
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Air Force Seeking Legal Talent
The Commanding General of the Tenth Air Force has informed the
Colorado Bar Association that the recent revision of court martial procedure
has greatly increased the Air Force's need for officers with legal training.
Currently, a campaign is underway to bring to the attention of all
legally-trained reservists this critical need. Those possessing the required qualifications are being encouraged to submit application for extended active duty.
In addition, the Air Force has what it describes as "a very attractive program" for awarding reserve commissions to individuals possessing certain qualifications in the legal field with a possibility of immediate call to active duty.
Details of this new plan, which USAF is desirous of communicating to as
many legally trained non-reservists as are interested, will be made available in
the near future.
Gilbert Heads Weld County Bar
Robert M. Gilbert was elected president of the Weld County Bar Association at the annual elections held in June. Other officers named at that
time for the new fiscal year were Richard McKinley, vice-president; John
Dooley, secretary; William Rhodes, William Southard and Robert G. Smith,
directors; and M. E. H. Smith, representative on the Board of Governors.
Reports Needed And Available
Chester A. Bennett of Ft. Collins writes that he has an extra volume
of 18 Colorado reports and 16 Colorado Appeals, although he is short volume
25 Colo. App. and is in a trading mood.
Overheard In a Country Court House
The scene was a remote rural court room. A shy and backward farm
boy was called to testify. The counsel for the defense, in an effort to encourage him, said "Now, sir, stand up and tell your story like a preacher."
"No siree!" roared the judge. "None of that; I want you to tell the truth!"
Attorneys' Business Always Welcome

MALONE DRUG COMPANY
100 South Broadway (Broadway

DENVER

and Bayoud Streets)

J. C. MALONE, Manager

* COMPLETE
Drugs - Sundries

PRESCRIPTION
-

SERVICE

Cigarettes - Tobaccos - Beer - Liquors
Phone SPruce 6226

Free Deliveries in the City of Denver
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You've Heard About it...Wanted it...
NOW IT'S HERE!
SoundEraser, amazing new
"'first" renews
used SoundScriber discs 26

2.SoundScriber
BEATS ME I

times or more
-

..

saves 75%

in disc costs alone. Erases in
30 seconds.

Disc life lengthened to
13 full hours of dictating
capacityl Think of the
saving No equipment to
buy . . .quick, conveni-

ent, economical
Your used SoundScriber
discs erased in your
office

t
. ........

./OUNDA*RASER
TRACK MARK

..

or ours. Con-

fidential discs can be
erased in your presence.
The greatest savings
you've ever known . ..
greater by far than
ofered by any other dictating systeml

Automatic Disc Resurfacer

Hard to believe? Pick up that telephone ...
us NOW... let us prove itl

call

DICTATING & RECORDING CO.
614 Security Life Bldg.
KEystone 5577
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PIERRE ROOFING COMPANY
C. J. ST. PETER, Contractor

Wood Shingles and Composition Roofing
Roof Repairing
Interior and Exterior Decorating
Roof Painting-Spray or Brush
1453 Pontiac Street

Phone DExter 3869

Denver
Residence Phone: GRand 5894
Free Estimates

I Will Render Any Possible Assistance in Connection
With Your Law Book Needs.
American Low Reports
American Jurisprudence
Federal Code Annotated
U. S. Reports, Law Ed.
Hillyer's Annot. Forms of Pleading and Practice
Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms
Texts on All Subjects
LAWYERS CO-OP. PUB. CO.
BENDER MOSS CO.
91 McAllister St., San Francisco, Cal.

JACK LLOYD
P. 0. Box 3336
Denver 1, Colorado

For Better Results Use
KLEANWRITE PURE SILK RIBBONS

To Be Sure-

The Colorado

KLEANWRITE NON-CURL CARBONS
Frank A. Mancini, Publisher

FRANEL

CARBON & RIBBON CO.
1720 Arapahoe St.
MAIn 5359

Denver. Colo.

FOR LEGAL ADVERTISING
Gad06
GRand 0768
3630 OSAGE ST.

THE ARAPAHOE COUNTY
ABSTRACT & TITLE CO.
ROBERT J. KINKEL. Secretary

PHONE 7

LITTLETON, COLO.
HAVE YOU PAID YOUR DUES?

